中國上市公司定向增發利益輸送行為之探究

Abstract

本研究旨在檢視中國上市公司定向增發認購人類型對於公司定向增發折價幅度之影響，以探究定向增發利益輸送行為。本研究亦檢視公司治理結構與私募股權折價幅度之關聯性。本研究並進一步檢視相對於配對公司，定向增發公司於定向增發後績效為何。 實證結果顯示，對於大股東或內部人進行定向增發，其折價幅度顯著高於對機構投資人進行定向增發。前三大股東持股比例越高，定向增發折價幅度越大。此外，當定向增發對象為大股東，實際控制人為民營企業，則定向增發折價幅度亦越大。在定向增發後之公司績效部分，與配對公司相比較，定向增發公司之Tobin Q值顯著較低，同時，定向增發公司相對於配對公司而言，有較差的總資產周轉率與較低的營業收入增長率，顯示公司於定向增發後並未對公司的營運有顯著的正向幫助。 This study aims to examine the association between discounts for private placements and the identity of the investors buying the shares in China. This study also examines the impact of corporate governance on discounts for private placements. This study further examines whether the private equity firms outperform matching firms after the private placements.

The empirical results show that discounts for private placements sold to large shareholders were significantly higher than the discounts for private placements in which large shareholders do not participate. In addition, the percent of stocks held by the three largest shareholders was significantly related to the discounts for private placements. When private placements sold to large shareholders, the identity of the controlling shareholders has an impact on the discounts for private placements. Furthermore, this study finds that the Tobin’s Q of the private placement companies is significantly lower than that of the matching firms after private placement. The private placement companies have lower total asset turnover and sales growth rate than matching companies. Therefore, the empirical results suggest that the private placement firms underperform matching firms after private placement.